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1 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici are professors of law or jurisprudence 
teaching at universities in the United States, with a 
professional interest in the law governing religious 
freedom and its development in the courts: 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan.  Professor of Law and 
John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies, 
Villanova University School of Law. 
 
Teresa Stanton Collett. Professor of Law, 
University of St. Thomas. 
 
David K. DeWolf. Professor of Law, Gonzaga 
University School of Law. 
 
Bruce P. Frohnen. Professor of Law, Ohio Northern 
University. 
 
Alan J. Meese. Ball Professor of Law, The College of 
William & Mary. 
 
Michael P. Moreland. Professor of Law, Villanova 
University School of Law. 
 
                                                 
1 Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of amicus 
briefs.  No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or 
in part, and no party nor their counsel made any monetary 
contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or 
submission. 
 
 
 
2 
Nathan B. Oman. Tazwell Taylor Research 
Professor & Professor of Law, The College of William  
& Mary. 
 
Michael Stokes Paulsen. Distinguished University 
Chair & Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
 
Robert J. Pushaw. James Wilson Endowed 
Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.  
 
Tuan Samahon. Professor of Law, Villanova 
University School of Law.  
 
Rodney K. Smith.   Professor of Practice, Sandra 
Day O’Connor  College of Law, Arizona State 
University. 
 
Steven D. Smith.  Warren Distinguished Professor 
of Law, Co-Executive Director, Institute for Law & 
Religion, and Co-Executive Director, Institute for 
Law & Philosophy, University of San Diego. 
 
O. Carter Snead. William P. and Hazel B. White 
Director, Center for Ethics and Culture, and 
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.  
 
 
 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Suppose a federal law permitted government 
officials to enter a Catholic church and use church 
property to distribute abortifacients and 
contraceptives over the Church’s objection.  A law 
that authorized such commandeering of church 
property would burden the church’s religious exercise, 
even if government paid for the drugs and 
compensated the church for the use of its resources. 
By commandeering church property, such a law 
would force the church to be complicit in activity to 
which it has serious religious objections. 
 
 That is what the government has done in this 
case.  The Little Sisters of the Poor, an order of 
Catholic nuns, object to participating in the 
distribution of abortifacients and contraceptives to 
their employees.2  Although the government insists 
that revised regulations of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) relieve the nuns of the 
obligation to pay for these drugs, HHS still 
commandeers health care plans created and 
controlled by the nuns and uses them to distribute 
abortifacients and contraceptives. State and federal 
law treat these health care plans as the property of 
the Little Sisters of the Poor.  Thus, the Little Sisters 
make the unremarkable claim that HHS 
substantially burdens their religious exercise when it 
                                                 
2  Petitioners include other religious organizations and their 
health care plans who are similarly situated to the Little Sisters 
of the Poor.  For convenience and clarity, however, this brief 
refers only to the Little Sisters of the Poor. 
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uses their property in ways that offend their faith’s 
teachings. 
 
 The courts below in this and similar cases, 
however, have fundamentally misunderstood the 
nature of the burden created by the HHS regulations.  
No one claims that the nuns are forced to directly 
purchase abortifacients, nor is their religion 
burdened merely because they have to complete 
additional forms.  These arguments miss the basic 
issue in this case. Nonetheless, courts have 
erroneously focused on the fact that the Little Sisters 
of the Poor are not financially liable for the drugs and 
that the HHS paperwork requirements created are 
minimal. 
 
HHS burdens the Little Sisters’ religious 
exercise by commandeering the nuns’ property.  HHS 
threatens the nuns with millions of dollars in fines if 
they refuse to cooperate in government efforts to use 
their own plans in ways that they find religiously 
abhorrent.   
 
ARGUMENT  
 By commandeering the health care plan 
created, controlled, and owned by Petitioners, the 
Department’s regulations force them to participate in 
distributing religiously objectionable abortifacients 
and contraceptives. 
 
 
 
 
5 
I.    The Department’s regulations burden      
Petitioners’ religion by commandeering 
their property and using it to distribute 
abortifacients and contraceptives. 
 The burden imposed by HHS regulations can 
best be understood though analogy.  Suppose a law 
permitted government officials to require the nuns of 
the Little Sisters of the Poor to distribute 
abortifacients and contraceptives personally to their 
employees.  The government would pay for the drugs 
and compensate the nuns for their time and expenses, 
so there would be no financial complicity in the 
distribution of the pharmaceuticals.  Further, the 
nuns would be free to voice their religious objections 
while distributing the abortifacients and 
contraceptives.  The government would even take 
steps to insure that anyone receiving the drugs from 
the nuns understood their religious objections.  That 
law would impose no financial burden on the nuns, 
and handing out the abortifacients could be done 
easily, requiring less effort than other regulatory 
requirements with which Petitioners must comply. 
Yet that law would place a substantial burden on the 
nuns’ religious exercise. 
  
 Now imagine that the law, rather than 
requiring that the nuns personally distribute the 
abortifacients, allowed a government official to enter 
the nuns’ facilities and use their medicine carts and 
other equipment to distribute the objectionable drugs.  
Again, the law would fully compensate the Little 
Sisters of the Poor for their financial costs.  The nuns 
would be free to follow the medicine carts through 
their facility denouncing abortion and contraception, 
and the government would take steps to make clear 
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that the Little Sisters of the Poor object to the 
provision of the drugs using the nuns’ property. That 
law would also represent far more than a “de 
minimis” burden on the nuns’ religion.  Rather, it 
would directly burden the nuns’ religious exercise in 
the same way as the first hypothetical law. It would 
make them unwilling participants in the distribution 
of drugs to which they sincerely and seriously object.  
That this hypothetical law commandeers the nuns’ 
property rather than their persons does not change 
the fact that they would be forced to be complicit in 
what they sincerely regard as sinful behavior. 
 
 The HHS regulations are analogous to this 
second hypothetical law.  The Little Sisters of the 
Poor have created a health care plan that they 
control and that is their property.  The government 
seeks to hijack the nuns’ plan in order to distribute 
abortifacients and contraception. The Little Sisters 
have no financial liability for the purchase of the 
drugs, but that is not their claim.  They object to the 
use of their property.   
 
A. State and federal law treat employer-
provided health care plans as 
property of the employers, created 
and controlled by them. 
 Health insurance plans do not spring into 
existence ex nihilo, nor are they creations of the 
government.  Cf. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 
882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires 
employers to establish employee benefits plans.  Nor 
does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits 
employers must provide if they choose to have such a 
plan.”). Rather, employers design insurance plans to 
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provide employees with benefits as part of their 
compensation.  The health care plan of the Little 
Sisters of the Poor exists only because the Little 
Sisters of the Poor created it.   
 
As a matter of state law, employer-provided 
health insurance is a contract between the employer 
and the insurance provider to which the employee is 
generally treated as a third-party beneficiary. See, 
e.g., Sw. Health Plan, Inc. v. Sparkman, 921 S.W.2d 
355 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that employee was 
third-party beneficiary of contract between employer 
and its health insurance company); but see Cahill v. 
Eastern Benefit Systems, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 788, 792 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that employee could not 
sue as third-party beneficiary of contract between 
employer and insurance company providing benefits 
to employer’s employees).   
 
In the case of employer self-insurance, the 
relationship between the employer and the third 
party administrator (TPA) is also contractual. See, 
e.g., Multi-Craft Contractors Inc., v. Perico Ltd., 239 
S.W.3d 33 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding dispute 
between self-insured employer and its third-party 
administrator as matter of contract law).  Once 
contracts are executed, they are a form of personal 
property.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS Ch. 15, Introductory Note (1981) (noting 
that law of assignment in contract “is part of the 
larger subject of transfer of intangible personal 
property.”).  
 
Petitioners do not challenge the authority of 
the government to regulate employer-provided health 
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insurance in general. 3   Insurance contracts are a 
heavily regulated form of property and “[h]ealth 
insurance is one of the most heavily regulated 
industries in the United States.” See Timothy S. Jost 
& Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in 
Consumer Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 
395, 401 (2005). Rather, the Little Sisters challenge 
the lawfulness of the means by which HHS has 
chosen to exercise that power in this case.  Property 
subject generally to governmental regulation does not 
thereby lose its status as the owner’s property. 
 
In other contexts, federal law treats employer-
provided health care plans as employer property.  For 
example, health care plans may be assumed in 
bankruptcy and are treated as property of the 
employer’s bankruptcy estate.  See 11 U.S.C. §365 
(2012) (delineating a trustee in bankruptcy’s power to 
assume and assign executory contracts).  Although 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), the main federal statute governing 
employer-provided insurance, does not govern 
Petitioners’ health care plan, this Court’s ERISA 
cases illustrate that health care plans are the 
creatures of their creators, namely employers.  This 
Court has noted that “[e]mployers or other plan 
sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any 
reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate 
welfare plans.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
                                                 
3 There are, however, complex questions in this case over the 
precise nature and scope of the government’s power to regulate 
Petitioners’ health care plans under ERISA and the ACA.  See 
Pet. Cert. No. 15-105, at 11-13. 
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Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).  This is true 
even though ERISA imposes on plan administrators 
fiduciary duties to plan beneficiaries. 4   However, 
“ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirement simply is not 
implicated where [an employer], acting as the Plan’s 
settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or 
structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to 
receive Plan benefits and in what amounts, or how 
such benefits are calculated.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999).  Likewise, this 
Court has said “decisions regarding the form or 
structure of a plan are generally settlor [i.e. employer] 
functions.” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 
101-02 (2007) (citation and marks omitted).  In short, 
federal law treats employer-provided health care 
plans as the creation and creature of the employer. 
 
B. The regulations commandeer 
Petitioners’ health care plans to 
distribute abortifacients and 
contraceptives. 
 There are many ways in which HHS could 
ensure that Petitioners’ employees have access to 
contraception without cost sharing. However, as the 
D.C. Circuit explained, what the Department’s 
regulations seek to do here is make obtaining 
contraception “seamless from the beneficiaries’ 
                                                 
4  In ERISA argot, “plan administrators” and “third party 
administrators” are not the same thing.  “Plan administrators” 
are generally the employers who set up the plans.  “Third party 
administrators,” in contrast, are mere agents hired by the plan 
administrators to process claims and perform other clerical 
functions on behalf of employers. 
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perspective.” Priests for Life v. U.S. Dept. of Health & 
Human Serv’s, 772 F.3d 229, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
This “seamlessness,” however, is achieved only 
because the government uses the religious objectors’ 
plans to distribute contraceptives. Under the 
regulations, the TPA, an agent hired by the Little 
Sisters and terminable by them, would process 
employee claims to abortifacients and ensure that the 
Petitioner’s plan distributes the religiously offensive 
drugs.  See 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-2713A(b)(2) (2015).  
The only reason the TPA has a relationship with 
Petitioner’s employees, or access to the information 
necessary to provide them with abortifacients, is 
because the TPA administers the Little Sisters of the 
Poor’s health care plan.  Thus, it is untrue that “the 
acts that violate their faith are the acts of third 
parties.”  See East Texas Baptist University v. 
Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2015).   In this 
context, the TPA is not some remote stranger, a 
third-party unconnected with petitioners.  Rather, 
the TPA is the nuns’ agent, administering the nuns’ 
plan. 
 
 Some lower courts have suggested that the 
government is not in fact taking over or using the 
health care plans of religious objectors.  Writing for 
the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner 
erroneously claimed, “[a]ctually there are no efforts 
by the government to take over [objectors] health 
plans.” Wheaton College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 794 
(7th Cir. 2015).  He went on to insist that objectors 
are “mistaken when [they] tell us that the 
government is ‘interfering’ with [their] contracts with 
[their] insurers.” Id. at 796.  This claim, however, 
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was mistaken, as the government has acknowledged. 
In explaining its policy, the government stated that: 
 
The Departments believe that the 
third party administrators and health 
insurance issuers already paying for 
other medical and pharmacy services 
on behalf of the women seeking the 
contraceptive services are better 
placed to provide seamless coverage of 
the contraceptive services, than are 
other providers that may not be in the 
insurance coverage network, and that 
lack the coverage administration 
infrastructure to verify the identity of 
women in accommodated health plans 
and provide formatted claims data for 
government reimbursement.  
 
80 Fed. Reg. 41328-41329 (July 14, 2015) (emphasis 
added).  The “coverage administrative infrastructure” 
in this case, however, exists only because the Little 
Sisters of the Poor have created it.  Without the plans 
that they have authored and the TPA they retained 
to handle day-to-day operation of the plan, HHS 
would have to find another method to “verify the 
identity” of claimants and access their data.  As HHS 
admitted to this Court, “If the objecting employer has 
a self-insured plan, the contraceptive coverage 
provide by its TPA is, as an ERISA matter, part of 
the same ERISA plan as the coverage provided by the 
employer.” Br. Resps. Opp’n at 19, Pet. Writ Cert., 
East Texas Baptist University, et al. v. Burwell, No. 
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15-35.5 
 
Government attempts to “accommodate” the 
Petitioner’s religious objections did nothing to 
eliminate these concerns.  True, HHS claims to 
relieve the Little Sisters of the Poor of financial 
complicity.  It is a non sequitur, however, to argue 
that because there is no financial burden, there is no 
burden of religious exercise.  Indeed, this Court has 
struck down requirements that burden citizens’ 
religious exercise even when those legal duties have 
conferred financial benefits.  See Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that state 
government agency violated Free Exercise clause 
when it punished someone for refusing religiously 
objectionable but paid employment); Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (same).  Likewise, the 
employees would be notified in various ways that the 
Little Sisters of the Poor are not paying for 
contraceptives, see 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-2713A(d) 
(2015) (“The notice [from the TPA to employees] must 
specify that the eligible organization does not 
administer or fund contraceptive benefits”), but this 
notification does not change the fact that it is the 
nuns’ plan that is being used to purvey 
contraceptives to which they object.  It is the use of 
their property that constitutes a burden on 
Petitioners’ religious exercise. 
                                                 
5  As noted earlier, ERISA does not govern the Little 
Sisters of the Poor’s plan, but this does not change the fact 
that HHS is seeking to use their plan to distribute 
abortifacients and contraceptives to which they sincerely 
object on religious grounds. 
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II. The arguments made in the lower courts      
 as to why HHS does not burden religious 
     objectors are unpersuasive. 
The Tenth Circuit misunderstood the burden 
HHS placed on the religious exercise of the Little 
Sisters of the Poor.  Its analysis focused on two issues.   
 
First, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the 
government would assume the financial costs of 
providing contraception. See No. 15-105, Pet. App. 
48a. (“The accommodation relieves the Plaintiffs from 
complying with the Mandate and guarantees that 
they will not have to . . . pay for . . . contraceptive 
coverage.”).   
 
Second, the court asserted that filling out the 
paperwork required by HHS imposed only a de 
minimis administrative burden.  Id. at 48a. Other 
lower courts faced with similar challenges to the 
HHS regulations have characterized the burdens 
imposed on religious objectors in similar terms. See, 
e.g., Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 249 (“A review of the 
regulatory accommodation shows that the opt-out 
mechanism imposes a de minimis requirement on 
any eligible organization”). This approach, however, 
is misconceived. 
 
A. It is irrelevant that Petitioners are 
not financially liable.  
First, the government purchase of the 
abortifacient drugs at issue is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the Petitioners’ religious exercise 
has been burdened. The Office of Management and 
Budget estimates that in 2015 the federal 
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government will spend $1.1 trillion on the health 
care of American citizens.  Office of Management & 
Budget, Table 15.1 – Total Outlays for Health 
Programs: 1962-2020, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/. 
These subsidies take the form of everything from 
financial support for basic medical research to paying 
directly for the medical procedures of millions of 
citizens.  Through HHS regulations, the government 
has spent part of its health care budget on 
abortifacients and contraception, but those 
expenditures without more are irrelevant to the 
nuns’ claims. The Little Sisters have not claimed 
their religious freedom is burdened when government 
behaves in ways that they find religiously 
objectionable. Religious freedom “simply cannot be 
understood to require that the Government conduct 
its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the 
religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Bowen v. Roy, 
476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986). 
 
Contrary to the suggestion by lower court 
judges, see No. 15-105, Pet. App. 91a, challengers to 
the HHS regulations do not question this principle. 
The Little Sisters do not claim that HHS burdens 
their religious exercise merely because it pays for 
drugs to which they object.  Nor do they claim that 
HHS burdens their religious exercise because their 
employees might use abortifacients, which the nuns 
believe to be sinful, at government expense.  The 
nuns sue neither to keep the government from 
providing contraception to their employees, nor to 
limit, by force of law, their employees’ ability to 
obtain or use abortifacients contraception at no 
expense. Rather, the Little Sisters sue to protect 
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their religious integrity against objectionable 
governmental commandeering of their property. 
 
As long-time observers of this kind of litigation, 
we suspect that both the government and the lower 
courts feel exasperated that having been relieved of 
the obligation to purchase abortifacients and 
contraceptives, the Little Sisters of the Poor and 
other objectors continue to challenge the 
Department’s regulations.6  But such impatience is 
neither warranted nor a sound basis for legal 
analysis.  The fact that the government has avoided 
violating RFRA by directly ordering the Little Sisters 
of the Poor to pay for contraceptives does not leave 
HHS free to violate RFRA by commandeering the 
nuns’ health care plans.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“By 
requiring [religious objectors] to arrange for such 
                                                 
6 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner 
disappointingly suggested that the plaintiff, a Christian liberal 
arts college, was lying when it claimed that it would have no 
RFRA objection to the Department’s regulations if the College’s 
health care plan was not used to distribute abortifacients.  See 
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“At oral argument Wheaton’s lawyer said that his client has no 
objection to the government’s using the college’s insurers to 
provide emergency-contraceptive coverage as long as it’s not 
‘using’ Wheaton’s contract with the insurers . . . . We wonder.”).  
Elsewhere, in the opinion Judge Posner suggested that the 
plaintiff’s real goal was to make it more difficult for students to 
obtain abortifacients.  See id. at 797 (“But it seeks to make that 
access more difficult”).  These asides were irrelevant to the legal 
questions Judge Posner was addressing, but reveal an 
unfortunate unwillingness to consider the nature of the 
religious burdens created by HHS regulations.  
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coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they 
engage in conduct that seriously violates their 
religious beliefs” (emphasis added)). 
 
B. It is irrelevant that the paper work 
required is “de minimis”  
The Tenth Circuit and other lower courts have 
also emphasized that HHS regulations require only 
that objectors fill out a simple form. See Pet. App. 
48a. They correctly observe that completing the 
forms would take at most a few minutes and is far 
less onerous than other regulations with which the 
Little Sisters must comply.  Compare Priests for Life, 
772 F.3d at 237 (“All Plaintiffs must do to opt out is 
to express what they believe and seek what they 
want via a letter or two-page form.”). This argument, 
however, misunderstands the nature of the religious 
burden in this case. What is objectionable about the 
HHS regulations is not that they require religious 
employers to complete additional paperwork.  The 
regulations burden the Little Sisters by 
commandeering their property in the service of the 
government’s delivery of drugs to which they 
sincerely and religiously object. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The fundamental question in this case is 
whether, despite this Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby, 
134 S.Ct. 2751, the government continues to 
implement the ACA in a way that violates the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act by forcing the 
Little Sisters of the Poor to assist in the distribution 
of abortifacients and contraceptives to which they 
have serious and sincere religious objections.  The 
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answer to this question is less complex than it 
initially appears.  The Little Sisters of the Poor have 
created a health care plan for their employees.  It is 
their creation and their creature.  It exists only 
because they created it.  It is a creature of contract, a 
contract that they authored.  It is ultimately their 
property.  The government wants to use it because it 
finds it administratively convenient to do so.  The 
Little Sisters object to having their property 
dragooned into these efforts.  The government is free 
to pursue its policy of providing preventive health 
care services, but it may not require the Little Sisters 
of the Poor to participate in that effort “unless that 
action constitutes the least restrictive means of 
serving a compelling government interest.”  Id. at 
2759. 
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